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Abstract
The current social reality is characterized by all-encompassing change,
which disrupts existing social structures at all levels. Yet the prevailing
view of society is based on the ontological primacy of stable hierarchical
structures, which is no longer adequate.
We propose a conceptual framework for thinking about a dynami-
cally changing social system: the Living Cognitive Society. Importantly,
we show how it follows from a much broader philosophical framework,
guided by the theory of individuation, which emphasizes the importance
of relationships and interactive processes in the evolution of a system.
The framework addresses society as a living cognitive system – an
ecology of interacting social subsystems – each of which is also a living
cognitive system. We argue that this approach can help us to conceive
sustainable social systems that will thrive in the circumstances of accel-
erating change. The Living Cognitive Society is explained in terms of its
fluid structure, dynamics and the mechanisms at work. We then discuss
the disruptive effects of Information and Communication Technologies on
the mechanisms at work.
We conclude by delineating a major topic for future research – dis-
tributed social governance – which focuses on processes of coordination
rather than on stable structures within global society.
Keywords: cognitive system, living society, information and communica-
tion technologies, future social governance, individuation, cognitive develop-
ment.
1 Introduction
Today’s society and life in general are characterized by all-encompassing fast
change and movement. New technologies, new jobs, new opportunities, new
challenges – i.e. new unknowns – seem to fall on us before we can figure out how
to make sense of the current ones. Our psychological reactions vary between:
(1) attempts to ‘stabilize’ the environment (social, political, technological, bio-
logical) by imposing more controls and checkpoints; (2) calls to embrace change
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and ride its wave towards a ‘new world order’; (3) ad-hoc proposals for dealing
with challenges of our times (e.g. information overload); or (4) a sense of helpless
dis-attachment.
No matter what the specific reaction is to the socio-technological change we
are experiencing, it is based on the way in which we make sense of ourselves,
others and the world. Usually we base our sense-making on perceivable stable
objects and their relationships in the world. A specific configuration of such
objects and relationships within a system describes its state. The change of the
system is then perceived as a chain of transitions between states. This is a well-
established mode of thinking which has helped us tremendously in achieving
most of what human civilization has created since its beginning. But is it still
valid in the era of ever-accelerating change?
This paper proposes an original conceptual framework for thinking about a
changing social system and applies it to the contemporary situation of the global
information society. The gist of the framework is an approach to a social system
as a living cognitive system – an ecology of interacting social subsystems. We
do this by developing the concept of the Living Cognitive Society – a distributed
social system characterized by the interaction of a multiplicity of heterogenous
agents and subsystems. First, we analyse the current situation of global society
and its underlying reasons, and ask the question ‘what kind of global system
could be sustained and thrive in these circumstances?’ (Section 2). Then we
provide a detailed tour of the theoretical concepts which form the basis of the
framework (Section 3). The description of the main concepts is followed by the
rationale of their integration (Section 4), which explains the application of the
theoretical basis of our framework to the situation of global society. The locus
of the paper is the detailed characterization of the Living Cognitive Society
in terms of its structure, dynamics and the mechanisms at work (Section 5),
building on notions and concepts introduced in the previous sections. Finally,
we apply the concept and mechanisms of the framework to discussion of the
impact of information and communication technologies (ICT), particularly the
Internet, on global society (Section 6). The issue of the governance of the Living
Cognitive Society is intricately related to the mechanisms at work within the
system, and also represents a distinct challenge and the field of research. We
therefore dedicate the last section to introducing the paradigm of distributed
governance (Section 7) as an avenue for future research.
We aspire to several goals simultaneously with this work. Most impor-
tantly, we aim to construe how the concept of the Living Cognitive Society,
and our approach to the global information society, follow from a much broader
philosophical and theoretical framework, guided by the theory of individuation.
Therefore, while the theoretical framework alone has been developed elsewhere
(Veitas and Weinbaum, 2015; Weinbaum and Veitas, 2014; Weinbaum, 2012),
this paper provides an integrated summary of the main concepts with references
to appropriate sources.
Hence, the paper combines: the conceptual framework (Sections 3 and 4);
the application of the framework to social reality (Section 5); the role of ICT and
Internet in the disruptive change of the global social system (Section 6); ‘con-
2
nective tissue’ – the interpretation of the current situation of society (Section
2) and consolidation of concepts with application (Section 4); and finally, av-
enues for future research (Section 7). These themes are not presented in a linear
fashion, but rather intertwined in order to better convey the relation between
the philosophical framework and its application to the global social system. A
number of cross-references are provided in the text for navigating its thematic
structure.
2 The current situation of global society
The current situation of global society can be characterized by the overwhelm-
ing feeling that the world is changing too fast for a single human and society to
comprehend. This feeling furthermore extends to the inability of coping with
change, at least without a paradigmatic shift in how humans individually and
humanity collectively relate to the world and themselves. There are two as-
pects to the perception of disruptive change of our social reality, both playing
an important role. The first is the actual acceleration of the life pace, which
can be connected to the relative, yet increasing, separation of humans from na-
ture. It is probably rooted in the dawn of human civilization, but has ‘become
a fully fleshed out experiential concept only with Industrial Revolution’ (Kosel-
leck, 2009), and arguably is reaching its climax with the rise of the ‘networked
world’ (Helbing, 2013; WEF, 2013). This separation has allowed humanity to
dissociate its activities from the rhythms of natural phenomena (day and night,
harvesting seasons, etc.) forcing the socio-technological acceleration on itself.
Another aspect is the psychological reaction to uncertainty, mostly related to
‘information overload’ and the ‘future shock’, inherent in our times (Heylighen,
1999). Both aspects contribute to the increasing social complexity of our world.
2.1 Factors of social complexity
Three major factors of social complexity can be identified: accelerating change,
hyper-connectivity and reflexivity:
Reflexivity is probably the most important characteristic of a social system:
it refers to the consideration that the social system is created by the
collective behaviour of its participants and, at the same time, exerts an
influence on the behaviour on its participants. Every participant (e.g.
person, institution, nation state) of society both affects and is affected by
other participants, causing circular internal relationships among them, as
well as mutual dependency between participants and the whole society.
Most importantly, reflexivity refers to a feedback relationship between
observer / participant of a social system (i.e. intelligent agent) and the
observed (i.e. the ’environment’ – the system as a whole).
Hyper-connectivity is a major symptom of progress, resulting in a world
where every agent, event and process is connected to many other agents,
3
events and processes, therefore making all elements highly interdependent.
The ‘networked world’ is therefore an example of a fragile system, where
local events may spread to affect the whole global system (e.g. in the case
of stock market crashes).
Accelerating change is due to the explosive multiplication of information in
the hyper-connected and reflexive system, which is our global information
society. It is a source of uncertainty and confusion in almost all domains
of social and human life, because participants of the system have lim-
ited capacity to process this information, let alone to match the speed of
information multiplication.
The central question which this paper aims to answer is therefore: what kind
of social system could be sustained and, furthermore, grow and thrive in such
circumstances?
2.2 Fluidity versus Hierarchy?
Due to increasing social complexity, the future of global society no longer resem-
bles the past, and therefore our mental and formal models lose their predictive
power even in the short term (Veitas and Weinbaum, 2015) resulting in an im-
pression of chaos, ‘crisis’ and ‘a state of emergency’. While accelerating change
and information overload are the actual characteristics of the current situation,
the ‘state of emergency’ is rather a subjective reaction rooted in our prevailing
worldview.1
The prevailing worldview held today derives from the Newtonian worldview
– based on the concepts of reductionism, determinism and objective knowledge
(Heylighen et al., 2006). Following this worldview we make sense of social reality
by looking for the existence of stable states in a social system. These states
are usually manifested as hierarchical relations among the system’s elements,
participants or subsystems. Change is then conceptually understood as a series
of transitions between stable states.
In other words, we are trying to mentally ‘stabilize’ the increasingly fluid and
changing social system by finding more or less stable hierarchical structures
within it and then reflexively enforcing them onto the system in the form of
governance systems and institutions we create. In terms of Figure 1, we are
used to thinking of social systems and global society as if having the hierarchical
structure on the right, while it actually resembles more the image on the left.
This discrepancy creates an impression that there are no good models (or even
worldviews) for understanding what is going on.
1The concept of a worldview is instrumental for the conceptual framework of a social system
which we are building in this paper and will be addressed in detail later (Section 3.4).
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Figure 1: Fluidity or Hierarchy?
In a situation of hyper-connectivity and accelerating change, the ‘stabiliza-
tion’ operation becomes non-effective – leading not only to the impression of
‘crisis’, ‘state of emergency’ and ever growing uncertainty, but also increasing
tensions within and fragility of the system. Seeing the global society as a di-
chotomy of ‘disorder versus hierarchy’ is counter-productive for understanding
and governing it.
2.3 A ‘Viscous’ society
We therefore emphasize the view of the global society as a complex system con-
sisting of interacting subsystems at multiple scales. Nations, states, religions,
languages, local as well as international institutions and governments, enter-
prises, philosophical schools and academic institutions, fishing and golf clubs,
families, persons and pets are only a few examples of subsystems of the global
society. While social systems are neither completely fluid nor completely hierar-
chical, we tend to see hierarchies in society, because: (a) temporary hierarchical
organizations do emerge and exist in it; and (b) it is related to our ‘wired’ ten-
dency to search and see stable ‘coherent’ patterns in messy data.2 But what we
seem to de-emphasize are the fluid dynamics of a social system which, we argue,
form a more fundamental characteristic of the global society than any observable
stable state, which is never permanent. Almost without exception however, con-
temporary governance structures are organized hierarchically, which leads to the
false impression that society can be described and, moreover, governed, based
solely on a hierarchical model.
Certain social subsystems and units, such as linguistic dialects, communities
or religious beliefs, are fuzzy, overlapping and interactive among themselves in
a largely non-hierarchical manner. Others, usually human-made systems, such
as companies, armies and factories are predominantly organized hierarchically.
Moreover, each social subsystem is constituted of a number of smaller scale
systems and each smaller scale system can be a member of more than one sub-
system at the higher level (Section 5.2.2). For example, the same person can be
2Pattern recognition forms the basis for categorization and concept learning. Hierarchical
organization is a particularly important way of organizing and relating concepts (Murphy,
2004), which is a necessary aspect of sense-making.
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a member of a fishing and golf club and speak several languages.3 Furthermore,
boundaries among certain subsystems, such as cultures or philosophical schools,
are far from being well defined or easily definable . The conceptually coherent
image of society is a ‘viscous’ system – combining different degrees of stability
and fluidity. Due to accelerating change, the level of ‘viscosity’ of society moves
towards higher fluidity up to a point where the aspect of hierarchical stability
becomes hardly visible.
Therefore, we propose to approach any social system including global society
primarily as fluid, while treating observable hierarchical structures as tempo-
rary ‘islands of stability’ in an otherwise ever-changing social fabric. The next
two sections introduce and discuss a rich array of concepts and theoretical ap-
proaches integrated into the framework of the Living Cognitive Society – a fluid
ecology of global society.
3 Conceptual background
The concept of the Living Cognitive Society integrates a number of propositions
brought forward by complexity science, cognitive science, evolutionary theory,
philosophy of individuation and becoming, and theory of assemblages. In this
section we briefly introduce each concept and emphasize its influence and inspi-
ration for the conceptual framework of the Living Cognitive Society.
3.1 Self-Organization in Complex Adaptive Systems
The Living Cognitive Society in its most abstract definition is an instance of a
complex adaptive system (CAS). CAS are characterized by complex patterns of
behaviour which emerge from interactions among a large number of component
systems (agents) at different levels of organization (Chan, 2001; Geli-Mann,
1994; Ahmed et al., 2005). The consequences of a huge number of interactions
are most often unpredictable due to their non-linear character. Still, interactions
are able to spontaneously coordinate among each other. Therefore, complex
adaptive systems are said to self-organize instead of being organized or designed.
Self-organization is the appearance of structure or pattern without an external
agent imposing it (Heylighen and others, 2001). Importantly, self-organization is
caused by a certain amount of disorder and fluctuations in the system – formu-
lated as principles of ‘order from noise’ by Heinz von Foerster and ‘order from
fluctuations’ by Ilya Prigogine (ibid.). These principles point to an important
understanding that fluidity, disorder, fluctuations and uncertainty are not only
‘undesirable side effects’ which should be minimized in a complex adaptive sys-
tem, but actually are necessary for it to evolve, adapt and thrive. Therefore,
a social system that can thrive in uncertain environments, needs to reconcile a
chaotic element in it – a crucial insight which we accommodate into the concept
of the Living Cognitive Society.
3See The ”Five Graces Group” et al. (2009) for the perspective on language as a complex
adaptive system with a fundamentally social function.
6
3.2 Living and cognitive systems
We see the virtue of combining the concepts of living and cognitive systems to
describe global society due to their potency to account for emerging higher level
coordination mechanisms within the system.
Therefore, we propose to analyse global society as a living system (Miller,
1975) which is also an ecology for other living systems (Figure 4). Examples of
living systems can be complex multi-cellular organisms exhibiting a high degree
of internal coordination (e.g. vertebrates), but also loosely coordinated organ-
isms (e.g. rhizomes and mycorrhizal networks). Clearly, the level of coordination
in the living system is a defining characteristic that can bear disparate values.
Living and cognitive systems are categorized in the same equivalence class
(Maturana and Varela, 1980, p. 13) or as closely related (Luhmann, 1986, p.
85). Also, Miller (1975) treats society as a living system based on the analysis
of its properties.
In the context of global society, we are therefore faced with the question of
what the nature and dynamics of coordination are in a society as a living system.
Understanding of the close relationship between living, cognitive and social is
reflected in the name of the Living Cognitive Society – the central concept of
this paper.
3.3 Enaction
We largely subscribe to the research program of enaction (Stewart et al., 2010)
for providing a conceptual framework of self-organization in a living cognitive
system. The enactive approach treats cognition as an adaptive process of the in-
teraction between an agent and its environment. Importantly, it considers that
the boundary between an agent and its environment is constituted by these
interactions and largely defines an agent’s identity, whereas identity of a self-
organizing system is ‘generated whenever a precarious network of dynamical
processes becomes operationally closed’ (Di Paolo et al., 2010, p. 38). Opera-
tionally closed networks of processes are adaptively autopoietic systems, i.e. ca-
pable of creating and sustaining themselves as well as continuously improving
their own conditions (ibid., p. 50) (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p. 78).
Simply put, living cognitive systems ‘have a say’ in shaping the tendencies
that constrain and shape their own developmental dynamics and effectively
constitute their own identity. The enactive approach gives us the understanding
that these tendencies are not given from outside of the system, but are rather
self-generated from the interaction of the components within the system.
3.4 Sense-making and a worldview
The essence of the sense-making process is already encoded in the word itself
– it is an active ‘making’ of a ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ by an observer – a cognitive
agent. The concept does not overlook the fact that sense-making is based on
extracting information about observable patterns in the system (the world, self
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and others) being perceived. But, at the same time, it emphasizes that it is the
observer who decides what the significant patterns are from which to extract
the data about a system or phenomenon. Sense-making is rooted in the enactive
approach to cognition (Section 3.3) which puts the concept in a larger context,
first of all entailing the individuation of the very agent which performs sense-
making.4 For an in-depth definition of the sense-making concept, please refer
to Section 1.3 of (Weinbaum and Veitas, 2014).
The process of sense-making begets a worldview. Importantly, the relation-
ship between sense-making and a worldview is a reflexive one – an observer’s
worldview determines significancies which then influence the sense-making pro-
cess of the same observer. The concept of a worldview is a rich and multi-
dimensional one (see Vidal, 2008; Vidal and Dick, 2014 for an in-depth dis-
cussion and references). It can be understood as a gestalt perception – unique
and integrated cognitive structure – held individually or collectively in relation
to self, others, society, and the cosmos at large (Markley and Harman, 1981;
Veitas and Weinbaum, 2015). With respect to the social system we are living
in, each worldview includes our aspirations, the views on ‘natural tendencies’
and ‘trends’ of the system, and related possibilities for the future as well as
approaches to the appropriate modes of social governance. Each of these as-
pects is based on a combination of sense-making perspectives which may be
overlapping, incompatible or even mutually exclusive. For example, individu-
als or collectives may prefer exploration, growth and development of persons,
society and life in general, or, alternatively, stability, safety and preservation.
Often such preferences cannot be accommodated within a single value system
and represent different ‘points of view’ of the same phenomena.
The Living Cognitive Society is the multiplicity of interacting embodiments
of worldviews, representing different value systems and points of view. In a
‘viscous’ society (Section 2.3), where no single value system or worldview can
be considered dominant or ‘objectively’ better/best, the resilience and growth of
the global system depends on the mode of interaction among many worldviews
rather than on the properties of any one of them.
3.5 Synthetic cognitive development
The theory of cognitive development posits identifiable patterns of human cog-
nitive development, which are described as developmental stages (Piaget, 1971)
or truces (Kegan, 1982), usually ordered in predictable sequences. Cognitive
development theories generally describe an ‘evolution of meaning’ (ibid.): the
recursive subject and object relationship when the subject of a previous stage,
becomes an object during the next stage. The process is not linear, but rather
is manifested through sequences of integration and disintegration of cognitive
4We employ the simplification of a well defined observer - observed distinction (i.e. agent
- environment) at this point mostly for didactic purposes. Actually, the distinction between
observer and observed itself individuates during the process of synthetic cognitive development
(Section 3.5). For in-depth analysis of the individuation of agent-environment boundary,
please refer to Section 2 of (Weinbaum and Veitas, 2015).
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structures (i.e. developmental truces).
In Weinbaum and Veitas (2014) we generalize the process of cognitive devel-
opment to all classes of living cognitive systems (i.e. humans, societies, artificial
intelligences) and call it synthetic cognitive development. We define synthetic
cognitive development in terms of the variability of the level of internal coor-
dination (Figure 2) within a complex adaptive system – leading to the higher
cognitive complexity of a living cognitive system.
The generalization is achieved via a series of observations. First, human
cognitive development is largely driven by a cognitive dissonance – a measure of
subjective psychological uncertainty.5 Subjective uncertainty is nothing other
than ignorance about the state of the system and is related to the level of un-
predictability of the system’s behaviour. Entropy is used for measuring such
ignorance about the state of a system (Ben-Naim, 2012). Therefore, cognitive
dissonance can be understood as the level of entropy of a cognitive system
– a level of subjective uncertainty.6 Finally we observe that the level of en-
tropy/uncertainty in a cognitive system is consonant with the level of disorder
in a complex adaptive system. The concept of synthetic cognitive development
therefore operationalizes ‘order from noise’ and ‘order from fluctuations’ princi-
ples describing self-organization dynamics of complex adaptive systems (Section
3.1). We apply these general principles of cognitive systems’ development for
understanding global society. It allows us to start describing the interaction of
processes of integration (i.e. leading to more order) and processes of disintegra-
tion (i.e. leading to more fluidity) and their primary role in the self-organizing
dynamics of the Living Cognitive Society.
3.6 Theory of individuation
The philosophy of individuation by Gilbert Simondon7 is the ontological foun-
dation of the conceptual background described in this section. The theory of
assemblages and the notion of tranduction – central concepts required for under-
standing the workings of the Living Cognitive Society – are direct descendants of
the theory of individuation. Simondon opposes the hylomorphic schema which
posits the dichotomy of form and matter: he sees the form, the matter, the
objects and the relations among them individuating together without any pri-
mary principle defined prior to this individuation. In the context of the present
paper we see this principle particularly useful for conceptualizing the social re-
ality, largely made of relations among social actors. The theory of individuation
allows us to reconcile social structures and subsystems with social processes,
which is a conceptual core of the Living Cognitive Society:
The relation is not an accidental feature that emerges after the fact
to give the substance a new determination. On the contrary: no sub-
5Section 1.4 in (Weinbaum and Veitas, 2014, p. 6).
6The entropic brain hypothesis by Carhart-Harris et al. (2014), showing that the entropy
of brain activity is associated with mental states, supports this observation.
7Refer to Section 2.1 in (Weinbaum and Veitas, 2014, p. 13) for a brief philosophical
introduction.
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Figure 2: A general scheme of synthetic cognitive development qualitatively visualizing
the process of increasing cognitive complexity as a variation of internal coordination levels within
the cognitive system. The bold curve represents a possible development trajectory; Circles with
numbers represent states of development, arbitrarily chosen for illustration. States (1), (3), (7) and
(9) mark high cognitive dissonance states where the system has the highest possibility of ‘choice’
between alternative developmental trajectories. Dashed lines are drawn at stage (7) to illustrate
multiple possible trajectories that are actually present at every point along the developmental
trajectory. States (2), (4), (5) and (8) mark stable periods when the operation of a cognitive system
is constrained. Stages 1, 2, 3 and 4 on the horizontal axis illustrate cognitive development stages as
described by the developmental psychology representing punctuated manner of increase in cognitive
complexity. The process is reinforced by the interacting / alternating forces of integration and
disintegration.
stance can exist or acquire determinate properties without relations
to other substances and to a specific milieu. To exist is to be con-
nected. This philosophical proposition allows Simondon to establish
the scope of his project: to reconcile being (l’e´tre) and becoming (le
devenir) (Pascal Chabot, 2013, p. 77).
Most importantly, Simondon’s theory of individuation, while being an ab-
stract ontological framework, at the same time promotes what can be called
‘concretization’ – the explanation of the emergence of observable and graspable
objects and relations in the social or socio-technological reality, as well as the
relationships between them. In other words, ‘concretization’ allows us to ap-
proach the emergence of order from noise in an abstract way, as well as to apply
the concept to the specific system - the Living Cognitive Society.
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3.7 Theory of assemblages
The theory of assemblages was introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and
further modified and developed by DeLanda (2006). Our usage of the theory
and its concepts is motivated by a number of reasons:
• The theory of assemblages provides an avenue for conceptualization of a
generative model of individuation. At its original level of abstraction, the
theory could be seen as a direction towards formulating mechanisms of the
process of becoming, i.e. emergence of objects, systems and subsystems
and their relations from initial noise and disorder.
• Furthermore, DeLanda (ibid.) has developed the theory as a philosophical
framework explaining the emergence of scalable social entities such as
personal networks, social organizations, markets, cities, nation states, etc.
General premises and concepts offered by it are broadly applicable to the
study of coalitions of cognitive agents and living systems, especially in
cases of heterogeneous and hybrid populations of human and non-human
agents (Weinbaum, 2012).
• As will become clear later, we view any entity that can be assigned with
certain degree of autonomy, intentionality and identity as a cognitive
agent. We maintain that such a view, partially inspired by Latour (1996),
is reasoned and informative with respect to the global information society,
especially considering its future developments in the short and medium-
term (Veitas and Weinbaum, 2015).
Furthermore, assemblage theory builds on the distinction between relations
of interiority and exteriority, which relates closely to the distinction between
subject and object in the framework of synthetic cognitive development. It also
develops the concepts of territorialization and deterritorialization, which we
reformulate as processes of integration and disintegration within the framework
of synthetic cognitive development.
One and the same assemblage can have components working to sta-
bilize its identity as well as components forcing it to change or even
transforming it into a different assemblage. In fact one and the same
component may participate in both processes by exercising different
sets of capacities. (DeLanda, 2006, p. 12)
3.7.1 Territorialization and deterritorialization
The notion of interaction between processes of deterritorialization and territo-
rialization originated from Deleuze and Guattari (1983); Deleuze and Guattari
(1987), first in the context of socio-economics of production, and then with re-
lation to the dynamical systems theory and self-organizing material systems.
DeLanda (2006) applies the concept when developing the theory of assemblages
as one of the dimensions / axes along which the specific assemblage is defined.
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This dimension delineates variable processes in which components of a system
become involved and which either stabilize the identity of an assemblage, by
increasing its degree of internal homogeneity and sharpness of its boundaries,
or destabilize it. The former is referred to as a process of territorialization
and the latter as a process of deterritorialization (DeLanda, 2006). The main
mechanism of territorialization is the formation of habitual repetition, providing
the assemblage with a stable identity, while that of deterritorialization is the
breaking of habits, effectively influencing and changing its identity (Smith and
Protevi, 2013, p. 34).
3.7.2 Relations of interiority and exteriority
The need to define the concept of relations of interiority and exteriority comes
from the notion of a scalable system – a multiplicity of recursively nested popu-
lations of heterogeneous assemblages which themselves consist of populations of
yet lower level elements. Relations of interiority are defined as relations between
lower-scale elements within the boundaries of an assemblage. Relations of exte-
riority are relations among elements across the boundaries of an assemblage –
i.e. with the elements of other assemblages in a population.
From the perspective of synthetic cognitive development, the distinction
between relations of interiority and exteriority is fluid, because, due to the pro-
cesses of integration (territorialization) and disintegration (deterritorialization)
the boundaries of assemblages are ever-changing:
Already at the level of physical beings, [..] interiority and exteriority
are not substantially different; there are not two domains, but a
relative distinction; because, insofar as any individual is capable of
growth, what was exterior to it can become interior (Combes, 2013,
p. 43).
The relation of the theory of assemblages to the framework of synthetic
cognitive development lies primarily in the conceptual understanding of indi-
viduation and becoming as the interaction among processes of integration and
disintegration mediated by temporary structures emerging within a cognitive
system. The actual mechanism of this interaction is unveiled by the concept of
transduction, which is introduced next.
3.8 Transduction
One of the most significant innovations in Simondon’s theory of individuation is
the concept of transduction – the abstract mechanism of individuation. Trans-
duction lies at the basis of the process of interaction between structure and
dynamics of the Living Cognitive Society. For the purposes of this paper we
single out two important aspects of the concept – metastability and progressive
determination.8
8For in-depth introduction to the concept of transduction please refer to Section 2.4 in
(Weinbaum and Veitas, 2014, p. 11) and Section 3.4 in (Weinbaum and Veitas, 2015, p. 11)
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3.8.1 Metastability
The ‘classical’ concept of metastability is mostly used to describe a far-from-
equilibrium complex system in terms of its movement in a state-space. A
metastable system can be seen as having a state-space with many basins of
attraction. Most of the time it is ‘being stuck’ in ‘shallow’ attractors which
may or may not be the state of system’s least energy. A metastable system
can be easily perturbed, in which case it moves over the border of one basin
of attraction to another (Figure 3). A classical example of a physical system
at a metastable state is water at 0 ◦C temperature. If water is still, it stays in
a liquid state (even below the temperature of 0 ◦C), but if it is perturbed by
vibration, it collapses into the state of ice.
Figure 3: ‘Classical’ metastability: A metastable state of a weaker
bond (a), a transitional ‘saddle’ configuration (b) and a stable state
of a stronger bond (c). Adapted from Harrison (2013)
What we add to the ‘classical’ understanding of the metastability is the
fluidity of the state-space itself, meaning that it can adapt or otherwise become
perturbed. The concept of metastability within a fluid state-space provides
a concrete notion of what in the theory of individuation is referred to as the
pre-individual – a seemingly disordered state from which an identifiable and
observable system may emerge.
The extended concept of metastability allows us to see the connection be-
tween the theory of individuation and complex adaptive systems. The ‘order
out of chaos’ principle can be intuitively grasped by imagining the state space
in Figure 3 being ‘shaken’ by an influx of additional perturbations. The energy
from the noise increases the probability of a system overcoming the ‘saddle’
configuration and ending up in another basin of attraction. In the case of a
fluid state space, the noise does not ‘shake’ the state-space, but rather changes
its configuration. An important implication of this difference is that in a fluid
state-space we can relate the transformations of a state space configuration to
the movement of a system in it, without positing an external source of noise
or energy, as is usually done within the framework of classical metastability.
This operation is important for understanding the mechanism of progressive
determination.
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3.8.2 Progressive determination
Perhaps the most important aspect revealed in transduction is the progressive
co-determination of structure and operation. Progressive determination can be
seen as a chain of transformations where an operation transforms a structure
and a structure in turn transforms an operation (Weinbaum and Veitas, 2014,
p. 11):
...S1 → O1 → S2 → O2 → S3 → ...→ On → Sn+1...
• operation Oi is a function which transforms one structure to another:
O2 = Si(O1);
• likewise, structure Si is a function which transforms one operation to
another: O2 = Si(O1);
• note that S1 6= S2 and O1 6= O2 – they are different functions;
• also note that → denotes the relations of dependency between the trans-
formations, so that every transformation depends on the full history of
previous transformations.9
4 Connecting the dots
Let us now summarize our train of thought so far. First, in Section 2 we asked
the question of whether our current social structures and, even more impor-
tantly, the modes of thinking and making sense of the social reality which guides
the creation of these structures, are still valid in an era of ever-accelerating
change. Our clear answer is ‘no’. We then ask a question of what kind of social
system could thrive in these circumstances. We argue that in order to conceive
such a system we first of all have to give up our prevailing modes of think-
ing about social reality, specifically – the assumption of supremacy of stability
and stable structures in it. The concept of the Living Cognitive Society – the
social system which we argue can remain resilient and thrive in circumstances
of hyper-connectivity, accelerating change and reflexivity – combines influences
from theories and conceptual approaches discussed in Section 3.
Drawing from complexity science and the concept of Complex Adaptive Sys-
tems (Section 3.1) we argue that in order to be resilient, the Living Cognitive
Society has to accommodate an element of disorder – a necessary component of
ecology of interactions among heterogeneous social subsystems. This does not
mean that there should be no coordination, but rather emphasizes the emer-
gent nature of it. A clear example of such self-organized coordination is to be
found in living and cognitive systems (Section 3.2). Processes driving emergence
of higher scale systems from the coordinated interaction of heterogeneous ele-
ments of a population at a lower scale is the subject of the theory of assemblages
9I.e. it should not be understood as a piping of inputs and outputs through the chain of
immutable transformations.
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(Section 3.7). Most importantly, the theory offers a concept of competing inte-
grative and dis-integrative processes (Section 3.7.1) leading to the emergence of
higher order dynamics in a social system. We further observe that the non-linear
development of cognitive systems happens via stages of integration and disinte-
gration. Therefore, cognitive development can be understood as a special case
of formation of assemblages driven by these processes. The concept of Synthetic
Cognitive Development generalizes insights from domains of cognitive science
and human cognitive development and applies them to the development of social
systems (Section 3.5). Assemblages which are being formed in the process of
bottom-up self-organization are non other than ‘structures’ which we observe in
a social system. These observable, yet often fuzzy, structures influence further
dynamics of self-organization in a system. The philosophical concept of trans-
duction (Section 3.8) provides an avenue for exploring and understanding the
mutual dependency between structure and dynamics in the Living Cognitive
Society.
Philosophy of individuation by Gilbert Simondon (Section 3.6) serves us
as the conceptual glue for integration of aforementioned disciplines and con-
cepts via a carefully constructed ontology where objects, their relationships,
structures and processes do not enjoy ontological primacy over one another but
individuate via mutual interaction. In order for the individuation of objects,
their relationships and structures to take place, the formation of boundaries
between agents and environment has to be explained, which is the emphasis
of the enactive approach (Section 3.3). The enactive approach treats cognition
as the adaptive process of agent-environment interaction. Both the theory of
individuation and the enactive approach deal with the abstract question of how
observable phenomena get determined from an indeterminate ‘fabric of reality’.
These introductions to rich interdisciplinary sources which inspire our think-
ing barely scratch their surfaces due to limitations of space and scope of the
paper. Yet our goal is not to fully describe these theories, but rather provide
the substantiation of characteristics of the Living Cognitive Society concept,
which we elaborate in the next section.
5 The Living Cognitive Society
The Living Cognitive Society is an ecology of emerging, interacting, integrating
and disintegrating cognitive systems at multiple scales (Section 5.1). This vision
addresses challenges of the current situation of the global social system (Section
2) and incorporates a novel line of conceptual thinking (Section 3). Namely, it
is a conceptual framework for conceiving the integration of social institutions
into the flexible, fluid and adaptable global society operating in circumstances
of uncertainty and change.
The Living Cognitive Society is described: (1) in terms of its scalable struc-
ture – A World of Views (Section 5.1); (2) in terms of its dynamics – the process
of Synthetic Cognitive Development (Section 5.2); and (3) in the coupling and
interaction of structure and dynamics (Section 5.3).
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5.1 Structure: A World of Views
Society is the vast ecology of interactions and communications among agents –
more or less fuzzy integrated social assemblages and institutions: nations, states,
religions, cultures, companies and governments, factories, academic institutions
and families. If we abstract from the concrete examples of social subsystems
(i.e. persons, families, etc.) we can start regarding the scalable structure of
the social system where interacting generic cognitive agents (i.e. individuals)
assemble into cognitive agents at higher scales (i.e. organizations, cities), in-
teractions among which create ecosystems (i.e. markets, communities, nations),
which shape global society. In a scalable system, every subsystem can be ap-
proached as an element of a heterogeneous population which forms assemblages
at a higher scale or, alternatively, itself as an assemblage of a population of
elements at a lower scale. The adjacent scales of the system interact among
each other.
Figure 4: The structure of global society.
Abstracting further we observe that each social subsystem can be understood
as an embodiment of a certain worldview embedded in its own unique social
context. A worldview is the integral system of sense-making, incorporating
cognitive and behavioural patterns which govern social interactions of a system,
embodying the worldview (Section 3.4). For example, individuals have value
systems, organizations and companies – by-laws, cities – regulations, states –
laws, etc., all of which are expressions of their worldviews.
Social subsystems – embodiments of worldwiews – operate as cognitive agents
with their own knowledge, competence, values, goals and styles of behaviour.
In a social context, a worldview can be embodied as a person, a family, an
organization or a company. But actually any social subsystem with diverse
levels of technological involvement can be accommodated within this framework
(Section 6.2.2). By taking this perspective we enable ourselves to: (1) approach
the impact of technological developments to the social systems’ dynamics within
the unified conceptual framework; (2) start describing not only interactions
at one scale (e.g. persons with persons) but also interactions between scales
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(e.g. persons with nation states).10
A social system whose subsystems are abstracted from their specific em-
bodiments, i.e. understood purely in terms of worldviews, is A World of Views
– a conceptual construct depicting society as a multiplicity of interacting em-
bodiments of unique, modular and open-ended co-evolving worldviews. The
construct of A World of Views was developed as a philosophical framework and
first used for describing a futuristic socio-technological system by Veitas and
Weinbaum (2015). It emphasizes an ecological view of global society as a super-
organism (Heylighen, 2002b), albeit having no single locus of control. Here we
apply the construct for the contemporary global society and its near future – re-
lated definitions are therefore adapted for this context. For broader conceptual
formulations we refer the reader to the original article.
We started this paper by challenging the prevailing approach of looking
at social systems, in particular, and dynamic systems, in general, as series of
transitions between their identifiable stable states. The alternative approach,
named a ‘viscous society’ (Section 2.3) approaches stable structures only as
‘islands of stability’ in an ever-changing social fabric. We can look at the viscous
society via the metaphor of photography: a picture is ‘stable’ only because
it captures the otherwise moving objects with the help of the short exposure
time. Yet it is possible to set a very long exposure and by that make a picture
where all fast moving objects (cars, people, sun, stars, etc.) are unseen. In
principle it is possible to set a long enough exposure for the picture to be blank
– i.e. not to capture any stable objects in it. The metaphor of photography
illustrates how greatly context-dependent is the property of stability of any
given phenomenon we observe. It also provides an intuition as to why in certain
situations (e.g. when a photographer wants to capture the trajectories of planets
in the sky instead of the planets themselves) the pre-position of stable objects
does not allow to whole picture to be seen. We therefore now turn to analysing
the dynamics of social systems without this presumption.
5.2 Dynamics: synthetic cognitive development
5.2.1 Processes of integration and disintegration
Dynamics within the ecology of A World of Views, which structurally describes
the Living Cognitive Society, is based on interacting processes of integration and
disintegration. These processes are the application of the theory of assemblages
and generic processes of territorialization and deterritorialization (Section 3.7.1)
to social systems. Here we define these processes in the context of a scalable
system, i.e. a system consisting of subsystems which themselves consist of pop-
ulations of yet another lower scale of ‘sub-sub systems’ in a recursive manner.
Integration is a process which can happen locally or globally in a system and
leads to higher levels of coordination among some elements of its popu-
lation at any scale. Clusters of elements which coordinate more strongly
10This aspect is central for discussion of a scalable system’s dynamics and the concept of
metastability (Section 3.8.1).
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among themselves than with the rest of the population start forming an
assemblage which, after reaching a certain level of internal coordination
and resilience, can be identified as a newly formed subsystem with unique
characteristics.11
Disintegration is obviously the process of the opposite direction from integra-
tion: it leads to a lower level of coordination among elements of a given
subsystem, ultimately reaching a level when a boundary between elements
within the subsystem and elements outside dissipates – i.e. the subsystem
disintegrates.
Despite being always present, processes of integration and disintegration
are never symmetric: at every given moment either one is stronger, giving rise
to the complex dynamics of the living system in an ecology of other living
systems. The interplay between the processes of integration and disintegration
of variable strength and the importance of this interaction in the growth of the
cognitive system is captured by the concept of synthetic cognitive development
(Section 3.5). Therefore, the maintenance of the interaction of the processes of
integration and disintegration in the Living Cognitive System is instrumental
for sustaining its resilience and enabling open-ended development.
The lesson of complex adaptive systems is that processes of disintegration
(towards fluidity) are as important for the self-organization of the system as
processes of integration (towards order). The awareness of such a balance is
clearly missing from current approaches to social governance. As we have seen,
the elements of the social system are its subsystems – institutions, organizations,
companies, businesses, governments, states. Therefore, trying to enforce stabil-
ity of social institutions – something that we argue is the prevailing paradigm
of social governance – makes the global system less ‘alive’ and therefore less
adaptable and resilient, especially due to accelerating change, which requires
ever-increasing elasticity.
11For the formal measures of coordination see also (Weinbaum and Veitas, 2015, Appendixes
A,B).
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5.2.2 Relations between scales
Higher scale s+1 Focal scale s Lower scale s-1
Relations of exteriority
(external perspective)
Relations of interiority
(internal perspective)
Figure 5: Relations between scales: Lower scale s − 1 is the
population of heterogeneous elements from which a subsystem at focal
scale s integrates; higher scale s + 1 is the heterogeneous population
made of subsystems of scale s. From the perspective of the scale s
subsystem, the relation Ss+1 → Ss is the relation of exteriority (i.e.
external to the subsystem), the relation Ss ← Ss−1 is the relation of
interiority (i.e. internal to the subsystem).
In a scalable system, every subsystem can be positioned at a focal scale s be-
tween higher s+ 1 and lower s− 1 scales (Figure 5). A lower scale consists of a
population of elements which integrate to a subsystem at a focal scale; a higher
scale consists of a population of subsystems of the focal scale.
The processes of integration and disintegration at a focal scale are driven
by interactions at both higher and lower scales. Relations between the focal
scale and the higher scale are referred to as relations of exteriority ; relations
between the focal scale and the lower scale – as relations of interiority (Section
3.7.2). The above extends and elaborates on a well known scheme of ‘upward’
and ‘downward’ causation, which argues that ‘the whole is to some degree con-
strained by the parts (upward causation), but at the same time the parts are
to some degree constrained by the whole (downward causation)’ (Heylighen,
1995; Campbell, 2013). Our extension considers fluid boundaries between scales
(i.e. what is considered a ‘whole’ and ‘parts’ in any specific situation) and the
influence of the processes of integration and disintegration on them. What it
actually means is that the distinction between interiority and exteriority, while
of utmost important for the operation of a cognitive agent as an assemblage,
itself gets individuated via the process of synthetic cognitive development.
In the context of global society, the scheme depicted in Figure 5 offers a
conceptual outlook at how communities, nations and institutions emerge from
interactions and relationships of the population of heterogeneous elements and
further influence these interactions. It relates to the notion of synthetic cogni-
tive development by referring to the processes which underlie integration and
disintegration.
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5.3 Interaction between structure and dynamics
In order to arrive at the complete picture of the ecology of the Living Cogni-
tive Society, we have to see how structure (Section 5.1) and dynamics (Section
5.2) inter-operate in a metastable system. We propose to explain this interac-
tion and, most importantly, evolution of the structure-dynamics relations as a
special case of progressive determination (Section 3.8.2). We can recall that a
metastable system is a system which is permanently in a configuration other
than the state of least energy and having a fluid state space. Progressive de-
termination cannot be understood without the concept of metastability, as it
describes the very mechanism of fluid transformations of a metastable state
space (Section 3.8). Progressive determination of a metastable system is the
answer to the question which we asked at the beginning of the article: ‘what
kind of social system could be sustained and, furthermore, thrive and develop
in circumstances of reflexivity, hyper-connectivity and accelerating change?’.
That is, the concept of transduction (Section 3.8) is applicable for describing
the mechanism of the operation of such a social system:
• First, it delineates how in a chain of transformations, every social structure
is related to the momentum of immediate change happening in the system.
Likewise, every attempt to change the social system should be related to
the current configuration of its social fabric.
• Second, it points at the deeply rooted unpredictability of the process,
which can lead to an either more or less integrated system.
• The mechanism therefore implies a variety of possible configurations of a
system.
The important message is that we cannot expect global society to be resilient
and growing by trying to artificially stabilize its structures in the circumstances
of all-pervasive accelerating change.
The structure of the Living Cognitive Society is a metastable system ap-
plied to a social context and taking into account the mechanisms of interaction
among its internal subsystems. Every observable structure in the Living Cog-
nitive Society (nations, institutions, families, communities, persons and their
relationships) should be understood as a specific state-space configuration of a
metastable system. As such, this observable structure (a) is temporary and un-
stable, yet nevertheless (b) influences the further transformation and evolution
of global society. Furthermore, social institutions, observable in the process of
change, can have different and varying levels of internal coordination – i.e. can be
more or less integrated depending on their level of cognitive dissonance (Section
2).
Armed with this conceptual model of the Living Cognitive Society we can
now describe how Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) change
global society in terms of their influence on the process of progressive determi-
nation.
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6 The disruptive impact of information and com-
munication technologies
6.1 ICT and Distributed Computing
Let us first define the two central concepts used in this section – information
communication technology and distributed computing.
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) acts as “an umbrella
term that includes any communication device or application, encompass-
ing: radio, television, cellular phones, computer and network hardware
and software, satellite systems and so on, as well as the various services and
applications associated with them”. A complementary yet somewhat more
modern term is cyberspace – a communication medium over computer net-
works, created by ICT. Both terms refer to the same phenomenon, but
with a clear difference between the emphasis on technical (ICT) and vi-
sionary (cyberspace) aspects.
Distributed computing “arises when one has to solve a problem in terms of
distributed entities such that each entity has only a partial knowledge of
the many parameters involved in the problem that has to be solved” (Ray-
nal, 2013, p. v). Distributed computing entails not only the multiplicity of
distributed interacting processes but also the fact that there is no single
overarching process which can centrally integrate or control the interac-
tion of this multiplicity. Therefore, distributed computation embraces
uncertainty and non-determinism and offers a computational perspective
to complex adaptive systems.
We find the above computational perspective instrumental for describing
the processes within the Living Cognitive Society, especially with relation to
Information and Communication Technologies. According to this perspective
the Living Cognitive Society is a distributed system consisting of a multiplicity
of processes of progressive determination, modelled following the principles of
distributed computing. Note, however, that while we borrow terms and con-
cepts from computer science, we do not use them in a strict formal sense. We
rather use the concept of distributed computation as a ‘lens for looking to the
world’ (Moore and Mertens, 2011, p. xv) in order to show how seemingly simple
technical processes enabled by ICT can influence and disrupt the dynamics of
the ecology of global society in terms of the impact on its structures (Section
6.2.2) and communication processes (Section 6.2.1).
6.2 The mechanisms of disruption
The disruptive impact of ICT on global society happens via the cumulative ef-
fect of three mechanisms: (1) accelerating interaction among the embodiments
of worldviews in the Living Cognitive Society, (2) multiplication and diver-
sification of worldviews and their embodiments, and (3) empowerment – the
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increasing social power of individuals. These mechanisms are reflexively inter-
related: accelerating interaction stimulates the development of social subsys-
tems and catalyzes higher diversity, while diversity of embodiments within the
same medium brings about higher volumes of communication and interaction.
Empowerment of individuals is positively influenced by the increasing fluidity
of the global social system and at the same time contributes to it. Each mecha-
nism – interaction, diversity or empowerment – taken separately, characterizes
a long-standing tendency of socio-technological development of human society
which is not directly related to information and communication technologies as
they are currently understood. Yet, ICT contributes to the amplification of all
three mechanisms. Most importantly, it greatly facilitates a positive feedback
among them – the actual determinant of the disruption. Let us take a closer
look at each mechanism, considering their reflexive relations.
6.2.1 Interactivity
Dynamic interactions among social subsystems are triggered by factors of social
complexity – reflexivity, hyper-connectivity and accelerating change (Section
2.1) – which cause an explosion of the amount of information flow within the
system. ICT enables, facilitates and supports this explosive multiplication of
information flow being exchanged among participants of the system. Yet while
the total amount of information in the system grows, the ability of a single
subsystem to process even a fraction of this flow (note, that processing of in-
formation most importantly includes selection for relevance) decreases. This
phenomenon is called information overload.12 Due to it, any subsystem (in-
dividual, family, company and/or country) is able to select for relevance and
process an increasingly minuscule fraction of the information available about
the events happening within the whole society. Therefore, the global system
becomes increasingly less graspable and predictable from the perspective of any
subsystem. In order to successfully operate in such environment, participants
– social subsystems – have to increasingly rely on the immediately available
external information.
ICT offers exactly that. Consider, for example, smart-phone usage for trav-
elling in a city. Before internet based navigation technology became widespread
(e.g. GoogleMaps; AppleMaps; OpenStreetMaps), people memorized their route
trajectories, and used printed maps. Note, that consulting a map application
on a smart-phone is understood here as first of all an act of communication
between two social subsystems – a human user and the navigation technology.
The technology thus made navigation much more efficient by allowing the user
to rely on immediate external information obtained through interaction rather
than internal representations of the route prepared in advance. It allowed the
user to consider quick changes of plans, transportation means and trajectories
12It usually refers to human limits of information processing (Heylighen, 2002a), but can be
extended to any generic cognitive agent – i.e. every system has certain limits of information
processing. We therefore can apply the concept also for understanding the dynamics of hybrid
populations of humans and technological artefacts.
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depending on the context (e.g. changed time of the meeting or delayed flight),
which an is essential aspect of operation in an increasingly fluid environment.
Therefore, the nature of interaction and communication of subsystems be-
comes relatively more important for the dynamics of the global social system
than individual properties, or the behavioural patterns of any single participant,
as well as the feasibility, predictive power or accuracy of any model of the system.
In the Living Cognitive Society, these interactions among subsystems are per-
ceived via the concept of the relations of exteriority (Figure 5), which, together
with relations of interiority, drive both the pace and nature of the cognitive
development of the system. In terms of the Synthetic Cognitive Development
(Figure 2) this means that ICT facilitates both integration and disintegration
processes (Section 3.5). Dynamic interaction between integration and disinte-
gration processes leads to accelerating change in observable stable structures of
global society via the emergence of new subsystems and dissolution of the old
ones up to a point where it makes sense to say that all hierarchical structures
dissipate in favour of an ever-increasing fluidity of the system (Section 2.3).
6.2.2 Diversity
As we have seen, accelerating interaction via processes of integration and dis-
integration brings about the emergence of more diverse embodiments of world-
views in the ecology of the Living Cognitive Society. Apart from facilitating
the existing channels of communication, ICT also enables social subsystems –
the embodiments of the worldviews – to develop new ways of interaction within
the same ecology. There is virtually no limit to the number of social identities
and assemblages that can operate in a social system. We have already discussed
how families, companies, institutions and states can be approached as social
subsystems of various scales. The following examples illustrate different forms
of social subsystems starting with the pre-Internet era, where ICT had little
importance, and finishing with the ones for which cyberspace is the basis of
existence:
Dame Agatha Marie Clarissa Christie was known by two ‘social identi-
ties’: (1) Agatha Christie, who wrote 66 detective novels and 14 short
story collections, and (2) Mary Westmacott who produced six romances;
Nicolas Bourbaki - sometimes called “the greatest mathematician who never
existed” - was a group of 20th century mathematicians which published a
series of highly influential books under the collective pseudonym.
Corporations are treated as legal personalities – non-human entities which are
created by law with their own rights and responsibilities, not reducible to
persons who are part of them.
Wikipedia is a famous example of how a trusted source of information can be
created without trusted individuals involved in producing it, and therefore
can be approached as having distinct ‘social individuality’.
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Satoshi Nakamoto is a person or group of people who created the Bitcoin
protocol and reference software which started the ‘blockchain boom’ with
potentially wide disruptive results for the whole Internet ecosystem (Swan,
2015). The ‘actual’ identity of Satoshi Nakamoto is unknown – therefore
it is a nice example of a social identity completely decoupled from the
physical embodiment.
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) is a futuristic concept
of an organization operating at an intersection of cyberspace and social
reality.13 It is defined as a decentralized network of narrow-AI-type au-
tonomous agents which performs an output-maximizing production func-
tion and which divides its labour into (a) computationally intractable tasks
(which it can motivate humans to do) and (b) tasks which it performs it-
self (Babbitt, 2014). DAOs may play the role of business entities as well
as non-governmental organizations without human management or even
human involvement.
All the above are single and integrated social identities which in the frame-
work of the Living Cognitive Society are subsystems of the same ontological
status, i.e. they are all embodiments of unique worldviews.
Cyberspace, as a digital medium, enables the easy creation of joint or mul-
tiple identities not unlike the examples given above. We therefore increasingly
start to see social subsystems with the variable ratio of human/technology
involvement. Along these lines, the radical dissipation of the difference be-
tween sociological and technological and the birth of socio-technological can be
best illustrated by the emerging concept and technology of a decentralized au-
tonomous organization. Therefore, individuals or groups of people operating
under pseudonyms, legal corporations, croudsourcing projects, synthetic identi-
ties and DAOs can be approached within the same framework of Living Cogni-
tive Society as social subsystems embodying diverse worldviews. ICT, being an
enabler, allows the embodiment and multiplication of worldviews, which would
be impossible without it.
Whether or not the dissipation of the difference between sociological and
technological reaches its radical levels, the influence of information and com-
munication technologies on the global social system is profound in terms of
increasing the number of subsystems within it and fostering meaningful com-
munications among them. These effects will continue to increase the ‘birth’ and
‘death’ rates of institutions, companies, states, communities, families, individual
social identities, etc., facilitating faster and larger data flows, communication
and interaction, inducing the higher fluidity of the Living Cognitive Society.
6.2.3 Empowerment
Technology in general and information and communication technology in partic-
ular, despite the immense possibilities it brings, is ‘only’ an enabler of different
13The name of the concept has not yet stabilized, therefore it is also sometimes called fully
automated business entity or distributed autonomous corporation/company.
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embodiments of worldviews and an amplifier of their interactions. Therefore,
while the development of a World of Views and the way it will affect social life
will be greatly enhanced and enabled by ICT, the direction of the disruption
will be determined by the “modes of the social inscription” of these technologies
(Zizek, 2013).14
A ‘real life’ example of such possibilities could best be seen in the ‘case’ of
the National Security Agency vs. E. Snowden (Poitras, 2015) which illustrates
a collision of two opposing social functions realized by the same technology:
the first seeking total surveillance and control; the other – freedom and diver-
sity of expression. In the vocabulary of the Living Cognitive System, this is
an example of opposite worldviews embodied in the same technology. While
particularities of embodiment are important, the direction of interaction is very
much determined by the worldviews themselves.
The case of ‘NSA vs. Snowden’, as well as ‘U.S. vs. WikiLeaks’, illustrates
another important aspect of the future global society – the greatly increased
capacities of individuals. A few years ago it would have been unimaginable
for one person or small group of individuals to ‘throw down the gauntlet’ to
a powerful state agency. Empowerment of individuals has profound systemic
effects adding to the factors of social complexity - by enabling persons or small
groups to engage in activities which can disrupt the whole global system.
7 Governing the fluid society
As we have seen, social subsystems are embodiments of worldviews which guide
sense-making processes and, at the same time, are shaped by them (Section
3.4). The dynamics of the Living Cognitive Society is driven by these inter-
acting worldviews via their embodiments. This is the central corollary of our
conceptual framework, which can by applied to the issue of governance of ecol-
ogy of the Living Cognitive Society (Section 7.2).
7.1 Fluid society - A ‘digital’ World of Views
The Living Cognitive Society will have a fluid identity (or rather it will be a
fluid process) emerged from an ecology of interacting diverse embodiments of
multiple worldviews. This fluid identity will reflexively shape the underlying
worldviews of its constituting elements and subsystems.
We draw a clear parallel between Living Cognitive Society and the per-
spective of the cognitive system as an ecology of interacting parts, components,
agents or thoughts (Bateson, 2002; Minsky, 1988; Dennett, 1993). The same per-
spective can be applied to society, individual humans, or any social subsystem
as a cognitive agent. No matter which social subsystem we consider, it embod-
ies certain perspectives of the environment that surrounds it – in other words,
it ‘has’ a worldview. As ICT enables embodiment of images and worldviews
14For the philosophical / psychoanalytical speculations of the possible modes of social in-
scription, see (Zizek, 2004).
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of humans and their groups with different degree of technology participation,
we may see an explosion of diversity of interacting identities – digital, physical,
‘natural’, ‘artificial’ and otherwise – within the ecology of global society. This
ecology and its dynamics, rather than command-control hierarchies which will
increasingly become temporary and ad-hoc, will determine and accelerate the
fluidity of the identity of the Living Cognitive Society.
With the concept of the Living Cognitive Society we have provided our an-
swer to the central question of this paper: ‘what kind of social system could
be sustained and, furthermore, grow and thrive in circumstances of accelerating
change?’ Yet the framework of the Living Cognitive Society raises a further
question – is it possible to coordinate or govern such a system and what gov-
ernance approaches will it require? The elaborate answer to this question is
beyond the scope of this work, yet the governance of the Living Cognitive So-
ciety is essential to the concept, and therefore the paper would be incomplete
without touching major aspects of it.
7.2 Distributed Social Governance
The current hierarchical order of global society is often referred to as ‘global gov-
ernance’ (Beauchamp, 2015) or ‘post World War II’ structures of governance.
At the core, this order amounts to the complicated, yet highly hierarchically
ordered network of governance institutions at local, national and supranational
levels. The ideal system of global governance, following the prevailing perspec-
tive, is a command and control hierarchy with a supranational institution (e.g.
the United Nations, or a ‘World Government’) at its top. Yet there is a clear
perception that the ‘post World War II’ structures are failing. The response
to the perceived risk of ‘fraying global governance structures’ usually amounts
to ‘building better structures’ or ‘strengthening democratic institutions’ (U.S.
Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, 2015),
following the same paradigm of global governance in terms of sustaining a com-
mand and control hierarchy.
What we propose with the images of A World of Views and the Living Cog-
nitive Society is the shift of emphasis from the structures and institutions to the
very process of creation, adaptation and dissolution of social subsystems at all
scales of the global society. Furthermore, the naturally distributed nature of the
process – meaning the absence of central body or ‘trusted party’ governing it –
should be embraced, rather than fought with establishing global institutions or
‘world governments’ since, we maintain, no stable structure is able to outweigh
the factors of social complexity driving society towards increasing fluidity. It
is difficult to imagine such a system, which we call a ‘distributed social gover-
nance’, but the latest developments in the ICT, especially Internet technologies,
may provide important insights and examples of the technological feasibility of
this concept.
While developing the concept of the Living Cognitive Society, we have em-
phasized the ecological nature of the interactions among diverse social sub-
systems. This notion primarily comes to contrast the prevailing hierarchical
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view of social systems and their governance. Such a view is induced by the
long-standing metaphor of the hierarchically controlled social organism. While
scientific developments have already done away with the rigid mechanistic image
of the organism (Heylighen, 2002c), contemporary governance institutions still
operate according to this obsolete paradigm. The Living Cognitive Society, in
contrast, highlights the distributed and synergistic aspects of the social organ-
ism as an ecology, so balancing and complementing the rigid hierarchical view.
This bias is well understood, taking into account the prevailing mode of how
humans individually and society collectively relate to the world and themselves,
but is not justified in terms of the pressing challenges of the current situation
of the social system (Section 2).
Therefore, the notion of distributed social governance most importantly re-
lies on the explication of the close affinity of organism and ecology.15 It pro-
pounds an approach to the Living Cognitive Society both in terms of the eco-
logical perspective – addressing the dynamics and fluidity of the system – and
organismic perspective – illuminating the emergent coordination from synergis-
tic interactions within it. No matter what kinds of technology will facilitate
the future of governance, we believe in a distributed social governance that will
be based not on the design of optimal institutions, but rather on the fitting
processes which allow for better coordination of the Living Cognitive Society.
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